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MEMORANDUM 
• I • 1 1 
TIle President asl<ed that I translTIit to you tl1e 
attached copy of his letter to a university student 
discussing the everlts planned for October 15. 
Most respectfully"', 
----
\ ~J n snn , •• ~ L~ L ~~~,c~~.-IP 
Bryce N .. Harlow 
Assistant to the President 
• I 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OC'rOBER 13, 1969 
Office of the White Hoese Prees Secretary 
-----~~~~~-~-~--~-~~~--~-~-~~~--~~-------~-~-~~----~-~~~--~------------
Dear Mr. Dicks: 
T:!-!5: 'Vf-IITE HCtlSE 
----
1. • , d 
E}~CHANGE OF LETTERS BETV'lEEN THE 
PRESIDENT AND RANDY J. DICKS 
In reply to your comments about my press conference remark that Ilunder no 
circumstances will I be affected whatever 11 by the demonstrations planned 
for October 15, 1 would suggest that there are several points you should 
bear in mind. 
First, there is a clear distinction between public opinion and public demon-
strations. To listen to public opinion is one thing; to be swayed by !?ublic 
demonstrations is another. A demonstration -- in whatever cause -.;. is an 
organized expression of one particular set of opinions. which mayor may not 
be shared by the majority of the people. If a President -- any President --
allowed his course to oe set by those who demonstrate, he would betray the 
trust of all the rest. Whatever the issue, to allow government policy to be 
made in the streets would destroy the del7l0Cratic process. It would give 
the decision, not to the majority, and not to those with the strongest 
arguments, but to those with the loudest voices. It would reduce statecraft 
to slogans. It would invite anarchy. It would allow every group to test 
its strength not at the ballot box but through confrontation in the streets. 
The planned demonstrations will tell us that a great many Americans are 
deeply concerned about the war; that some of these consider U. S. participation 
immoral; that many want U. 5'1 trrops withdrawn immediately and u?conditionally. 
But all of us in the .Administration are already well aware of this· sentiment. 
V~, e are already weI.! aware that it is widespread -- indeed, that no matter how 
many people might participate, there would be man}' more who share their 
concern. 
Therefore, there is nothing new we can learn from the demonstrations. The 
question is whether, in the absence of any new evidence or any new arguments, 
we should be turned aside from a carefully considered course. The policies we 
are now following reflect our own best judgment, based on exhaustive study of 
all the available evidence. of how to achieve that goal. To abandon that policy 
merely because of a public demonstration would therefore be an act of gross 
irresponsibility on my part. 
One further point: I respect the right of each American to express his own 
opinion. I recognize that many feel a moral obligation to expr es s their opinions 
in the most conspicuous way possible, and therefore consider such expression 
to be their responsibility. 1 respect that. However t my responsibility is 
different. I must consider the consequences of each proposed course of 
action -- short-terln and long-term. dor.nestic and world-wide, direct and 
indirect. Others can say of Vietnam, "Get out nOVJi ll when asked how, they can 
give the simple, flip answer: IIBy sea." They can ignore the consequences. But 
as 1 consider those consequences, in both human and international terms, I 
can only conclude that history would rightly condemn a President who took such 
a course. 
One of the first acts of my P .. dministracion was to review, exhuastively and 
comprehensively, every aspect of the nation's policies in Vietnam. -vVe hav'e 
drastically altered the policies we inherited. ·Vve are on the road to peace. 
,.. , 
• • 
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That road is not easy. It is not simple. But I am convinced it is the right 
one.. There is no problem to which I have given more of my time and thought. 
For nine months, we have 'Norked every day for a just end to a conflict which 
has been building for more than eight years. 
On October 15th, I understand, many will simply be saying: til am for 
peace. tI I ardently join with all Americans in working toward that goal. 
Mr. Randy J. Dicks 
Georgetown University 
Washington, D. C. 20007 
Dear Mr. President: 
Sincerely, 
lsI Richard Nixon 
* * * * * 
I think that your statement at your recent press conference that "under no 
circumstances" will you be affected by the impending anti-war protests, in 
connection with the tlViet Nam Moritorium, fI is ill-considered to say the 
least. It has been my impression that It is not unwise for the President of 
the United States to take note of the will _of the people; after all, these 
people elected you, you are their President, and your office bears certain 
obligations. Might I respec~ully suggest that the President reconsider his 
pre-judgm.ent. . 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, D. C. 
Yours sincerely, 
lsI Randy J. Dicks 
/I # /I # II 
